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Quantum Mechanics Unscrambled* 
Jean-Michel Delhôtel1† 
 
 
Abstract. Is quantum mechanics about ‘states’? Or is it basically another kind of 
probability theory? It is argued that the elementary formalism of quantum mechanics 
operates as a well-justified alternative to ‘classical’ instantiations of a probability calculus. 
Its providing a general framework for prediction accounts for its distinctive traits, which 
one should be careful not to mistake for reflections of any strange ontology. The suggestion 
is also made that quantum theory unwittingly emerged, in Schrödinger’s formulation, as a 
‘lossy’ by-product of a quantum-mechanical variant of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. As it 
turns out, the effectiveness of quantum theory qua predictive algorithm makes up for the 
computational impracticability of that master equation. 
 
 
 
 
“Our present quantum mechanical formalism is a peculiar mixture describing 
in part laws of Nature, in part incomplete human information about Nature  – 
all scrambled up together by Bohr into an omelette that nobody has seen how 
to unscramble. Yet we think the unscrambling is a prerequisite for any further 
advance in basic physical theory.  
…if quantum theory were not successful pragmatically, we would have no 
interest in its interpretation. It is precisely because of the enormous success 
of the QM mathematical formalism that it becomes crucially important to 
learn what that mathematics means. To find a rational physical interpretation 
of the QM formalism ought to be considered the top priority research 
problem of theoretical physics; until this is accomplished, all other theoretical 
results can only be provisional and temporary.”  
– E.T. Jaynes                                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*
 This paper is the final (v3) version of a 2004 preprint, to the original title of which it reverts.              
The previous two Arxiv.org postings should henceforth be ignored, with the understanding that no further 
update is intended. For those readers who missed the hint, the title makes slightly ironical reference to 
Daniel Dennett’s Consciousness Explained. Needless to say, this implies no pretence of providing any 
‘final’ answer to some vexing questions, but should be regarded as an invitation to tackle those without 
smugness and prejudice.  
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1. Quantum mechanics without ‘states’? 
 
“The best response so far is from Pauli, who at 
least admits that the use of the word ‘state’ 
[Zustand] for the psi-function is quite 
disreputable
2.”  – E. Schrödinger 
 
 
 
Should we follow Pauli and refrain from thinking of Hilbert space vectors or ‘wave 
functions’ as representatives of quantum states – given what the word ‘state’ is intended 
to mean: how something is and, by implication, what makes it such (which properties it 
has etc.) ? Given the lack of a satisfactory, widely agreed upon ‘interpretation’ of the 
basic formalism of quantum theory – some eight decades after its inception – this 
cannot be lightly dismissed as an idle question. Back in the late 1920s, Niels Bohr 
pointed out that, whilst observation implies “interactions with suitable agencies of 
measurement, not belonging to the system”, it is also the case that “the definition of the 
state of a physical system, as ordinarily understood, claims the elimination of all 
external disturbances
3.” In atomic physics, however, interactions implied by the 
operation of probing devices can never be assumed to have a negligible effect on our 
descriptive and predictive abilities. As a result, the idea of an individual system ‘having 
a state’ or its ‘being in’ one can no longer, in general, be consistently maintained: “an 
unambiguous definition of the state of a system is naturally no longer possible, and 
there can be no question of causality in the ordinary sense of the word.” Nothing in the 
quantum-mechanical formalism would qualify as a meaningful representative of the 
state of a physical system. Whoever, by contrast, keeps regarding a Hilbert space vector 
as one such representative would overlook a key lesson of the quantum ‘revolution’, 
mistaking its epistemic and pragmatic implications for manifestations of a baffling 
ontology: one according to which quantumstuff could at once be – no kidding – 
‘something like’ this or that, or perhaps this and that, but neither this nor that or partly 
this and partly that.  
Throughout his discussions with Bohr and until his last breath, Albert Einstein remained 
convinced that quantum mechanics is irrevocably inadequate as a truly fundamental 
physical theory, since it does not fulfil the descriptive and explanatory aims which, he 
believed, are those of such a theory. Einstein was adamant that fundamental physical 
laws cannot “consist in relations between probabilities for the real things, but [should 
consist in] relations concerning the things themselves
4.” As he saw it, the probabilistic 
use of ‘state vectors’, or wave functions, would rather indicate that they refer to 
ensembles. Whichever way Einstein conceived
5
 of such ensembles, he persisted in 
regarding the ‘mechanics’ of Heisenberg or Schrödinger as a makeshift, whilst keeping 
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up hopes that it would, sooner or later, give way to a truly worthy account of the 
interactions and properties of microphysical systems.  
Bohr’s and Einstein’s attitudes sharply contrast with those of some of their most 
prominent colleagues, and in particular Dirac’s. Indeed, the entire introduction to his 
Principles of Quantum Mechanics is devoted to quantum states and to their 
representation
6
. Dirac regards the task of setting up a novel kind of mechanics as a 
necessary response to the recognition of “a limit to the gentleness with which 
observations can be made
7” on physical systems. The principle of superposition would 
be “one of the most fundamental and drastic8” of a new set of “laws of nature”, which   
it would be necessary to introduce because such disturbance cannot be eliminated.   
That much sounds close enough to Bohr’s own views. However, Dirac also maintains 
that, as “a mathematical procedure9”, expressing a state as a superposition of various 
other states “is always permissible, independent of any reference to physical conditions, 
like the procedure of resolving a wave into Fourier components.
10” Permissible as such 
an expression may be, one should be wary of interpreting relationships between linearly 
superposed states, since those relationships “cannot be explained in terms of familiar 
physical concepts
11.” Dirac is well aware of the difficulties that a state-based account of 
quantum mechanics is bound to raise: we certainly “cannot in the classical sense picture 
a system being partly in each of two states and see the equivalence of this to the system 
being completely in some other state. There is an entirely new idea involved, to which 
one must get accustomed and in terms of which one must proceed to build up an exact 
mathematical theory, without having any detailed classical picture
12.” By way of 
addressing the “new idea”, Dirac comes close to venturing an ontological reading of 
superpositions: “When a state is formed by the superposition of two other states, it will 
have properties that are in some vague way [!] intermediate between those of the two 
original states and that approach [?] more or less closely to those of either of them 
according to the greater or less ‘weight’ attached to this state in the superposition 
process
13.” Aware that it is all getting shaky, Dirac hastens to add: “the intermediate 
character of the state formed by superposition thus expresses itself through the 
probability of a particular result for an observation being intermediate between the 
corresponding probabilities for the original states, not through the result itself being 
intermediate between the corresponding results for the original states
14.” But there 
remains the thornier question of hypothetically possessed properties in relation to their 
presumed numerical, empirically accessed indicators (the measurement results). Does it 
make any sense to think of such properties as in some way ‘intermediate’ between 
observationally ascertainable attributes – if the latter are what eigenvalues denote? 
Dirac brushes aside questions that one may be tempted to ask regarding the definiteness 
of ‘possessed values’ between observations, regarding them as ‘metaphysical’ issues of 
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no concern to the physicist
15
. The matter is settled: the principle of superposition 
derives both its necessity and its effectiveness from the recognition of an irreducible 
susceptibility of microphysical objects to disturbance, which just “demand[s] 
indeterminacy in the results of observation
16.” Once we have come to terms with the 
irreducible character of that susceptibility, developing a probabilistic framework with 
inherent linear features – superposition obliges – should not give rise to any qualms. 
A view of quantum mechanics as fundamentally about the specification, evolution       
and structural changes of ‘quantum states’ crystallized with the first abstract 
formulations of the principles of the new theory. After Dirac, von Neumann’s 
influential monograph
17
 greatly contributed to promoting a conception of quantum 
mechanics where ‘quantum states’ are pervasive (it is no coincidence that von Neumann 
should have been led, in that very same endeavor, to confronting a ‘measurement 
problem’ he could not solve18). However, in spite of Dirac’s claims, an idea of quantum 
state was certainly not forced upon the physicists as a direct response to theoretical 
puzzles, e.g. the black-body problem or the discrete patterns of atomic spectra. 
Heisenberg’s initial matrix formalism ignored such states, the very idea of which was 
fundamentally at odds with his focus on physical, experimentally accessible quantities 
and the way they evolved. Nonetheless, Dirac’s and von Neumann’s authority 
prevailed, and we have been stuck with those ‘quantum states’ ever since. Like it or not, 
thinking habits and word usage are intertwined and not so easily disentangled. Thus, 
referring to states, however loosely (or especially so), can breed some ill-advised 
expectations. One can therefore do worse – much worse – than be mindful of the critical 
attitude of some, at least, of the founding fathers; for they may not, after all, have been 
the elderly holdouts they have often been portrayed as. 
As we shall see in Section 2, a host of variously convincing, but certainly significant 
derivations of the elementary formalism of quantum theory converge towards             
the conclusion that it functions as a specific kind of linear predictive scheme, which 
differs in some essential respects from ordinary (‘classical’) ways of evaluating and 
computing probabilities. All those derivations have the common characteristic of 
proceeding from a minimal set of assumptions that are essentially neutral when it comes 
the ‘quantal’, microscopic or even physical nature of the ‘systems’ the scheme is 
applied to. Indeed, that scheme may well be relevant to conceptual domains and areas of 
experience which have little, if anything, to do with the subject matter of physical 
science. ‘State’ assignments would then be just a way of encapsulating a compendium 
of probabilities of possible outcomes (‘events’ or measurement results), any such 
assignment being referred to what will be, lacking a better word, called a preparation. 
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The word ‘preparation’ should not be taken too literally, e.g. as implying operations that 
would, or could, be consciously performed on a system. The assignment might just as 
well be the result of an informed guess at the ‘predictive potential’ of a given 
experimental set-up or observational situation. In any case, the resulting ‘state’ would 
have no objective significance besides its predictive function. Making use of such a 
construct would require (i) specifying how it transforms with time; and (ii) an effective 
algorithm for computing outcome probabilities given its initial or time-evolved 
expression. Such specification and rules are precisely what quantum theory provides. 
Those realists who believe that no physical theory is worth its salt unless it delivers 
objective truths about a pre-existing and pre-structured reality ‘out there’ will certainly 
recoil at the above characterization of quantum mechanics. However, acknowledging 
the chief predictive aim of the theory, and that its mathematical structure is wholly 
determined by the basic requirements such a purpose entails, need not amount to one’s 
surrendering to some barren form of operationalism. Rather, recognizing its 
fundamentally predictive role is a necessary first step towards a positive reassessment of 
the nature and scope of the standard quantum-mechanical formalism. As it will be 
argued in Section 4, a view of quantum theory as a linear predictive scheme can be 
consistently maintained together with a principle-based, if tentative account of the 
occurrence of and the need for quantization. Quantum theory, qua linear predictive 
scheme, will be seen to emerge as a result of selecting, either unwittingly (as it seems to 
have been the case in the historical development of quantum mechanics) or in full 
awareness of what such selection presupposes and implies, a certain class of solutions  
to Schrödinger’s equation (itself the outcome of linearizing a dynamical ‘master’ 
equation). Valuable light may thus be shed on vexed questions, such as whether 
standard quantum mechanics can be said to provide a complete picture of dynamics in 
the microrealm, or whether resorting to probability is indispensable. 
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2. Quantum theory as a predictive scheme 
                               
                             Erwin with his psi can do 
                        Calculations quite a few. 
                        But one thing has not been seen 
                        Just what psi really mean. 
                        – F. Bloch 
In the early 1940s Jean-Louis Destouches, a physicist with philosophical inclinations, 
made a rather remarkable, if long-winded and not entirely satisfactory attempt at 
deriving basic features of quantum theory from a minimal set of operational 
assumptions
19
. Destouches started from the idea that distinct measurements afford 
different resolutions of a given quantity A, associated with different partitions of the 
‘spectrum’ of its admissible values. It is assumed preparations exist, for which 
measuring A with a given resolution yields an outcome that falls with certainty within a 
given interval   
 . Destouches assigns to any such preparation a predictor
20
   
 , such 
that the probability    
    
    , and a suitable set of   
  can be chosen so as to form 
an orthogonal basis of an appropriate ‘predictor space’. Owing to this structure, any 
preparation to which a measurement of A at the given resolution is relevant can be 
assigned a predictor, in the form of a vector    that can be expanded in the {  
 } basis, 
with the requirement that       
 
    . Destouches’s next essential move consists in 
assuming that, for any quantity A, the algorithm for computing the probabilities of 
measurement outcomes given a ‘X preparation’ should be independent of the chosen 
partitioning of the spectrum of A, i.e. of the choice of basis
21
. The upshot is a 
probability function of the form          , where x  is a coefficient in a suitable 
linear expansion of the predictor X. The expression of f follows from a consistency 
requirement that implies the satisfaction of the Cauchy functional equation 
                      . 
Destouches leaves it as an empirical matter to determine the value of k.              
However, a formal proof that k must be equal to 2 was supplied a few years later by      
P. Destouches-Février
22
. The proof, which relies on a theorem by Birkhoff and          
von Neumann
23
, boils down to ensuring consistency between the projective            
(inner product) structure of the predictor space and the requirement that probabilities 
add up to 1.  
                                                 
19
  Destouches 1942. 
20
 Destouches uses the expression ‘élément de prévision’. 
21
 Somewhat similarly, Saunders (2004) has recently shown that, if the rule for computing expectation 
values depends only on conditions imposed on a preparation, then requiring that those expectation values 
be the same regardless of differences in ‘descriptions’ of the corresponding experiments is sufficient for 
constraining the rule to be Born’s.   
22
   Février 1946, 1956. 
23
 The projective character of a framework with a built-in nondistributive orthocomplemented lattice 
structure implies as well as requires the existence of an involutive anti-isomorphism over the reference 
field – the complex number field in the case of quantum theory (Birkhoff and von Neumann 1936, 
reprinted in Hooker 1975, p.14). 
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Several decades after Destouches, other significant attempts at a partial reconstruction 
of quantum theory were, in particular, made independently by Y. Tikochinsky
24
 and    
A. Caticha
25
. The idea of both is to assign numbers (real or complex) as an auxiliary 
device in the process of working out the probability of ‘transition’ between an initial (I) 
and a target (T) configuration
26
. (I) refers to an experimentally given or theoretically 
assumed preparation and (T) to the end product of an observation or measurement 
(whereby a new preparation effectively obtains). As sequences of transitions, mutually 
exclusive ‘parallel’ transitions, or both, are considered, assigned numbers – amplitudes 
– must combine in a consistent fashion. The relevant consistency constraints amount to 
requiring associativity and distributivity, and they result in an essentially unique form 
for the composition rules: those are the sum and product rules (‘Feynman rules’) which, 
in standard quantum theory, respectively apply to amplitudes associated with parallel 
and successive transitions. Given the assumption that the corresponding probabilities 
are mutually independent, the product rule for amplitudes then leads
27
, for the 
probability        as a function of the total amplitude, to what is in effect the same 
Cauchy relation that is crucial to Destouches’s derivation, hence            , 
where k is a positive real number. Identity of the endpoints in the ‘self-connection’ 
    warrants28 setting          as the probabilistic expression of a tautology. 
Breaking     down into a complete set  iK  of alternative subtransitions, given the 
sum and product rules for amplitudes       , leads to k=2 through the matching of 
                         
  with the requirement that the probabilities of all 
mutually exclusive subtransitions add up to 1. Allowing amplitudes to be complex,     
the amplitude for the inverse transition that is obtained by exchanging endpoints is 
shown
29
 to be equal either to the amplitude itself or to the complex conjugate of that 
amplitude. The former is ruled out because there would then be choices of amplitudes 
for which         
 
  vanishes (this is the nearest Tikochinsky comes to justifying 
the occurrence of complex amplitudes in quantum theory). The value 2 of k is, there 
again, found to reflect consistency between the additivity of probabilities and the 
projective structure of the predictor space
30
.  
Let the two ‘kets’        and        be predictors that are assigned respectively to two 
preparations      and     , and A be an observable, the measurement of which is used 
to distinguish (statistically) between the two preparations – think about one using the 
relative numbers of Heads and Tails outcomes in repeated tosses of two (not necessarily 
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 Tikochinsky 1988a,1988b. 
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 Caticha 1998. 
26
 The word must be understood here without any spatial connotation. 
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 Tikochinsky 1988b. 
28
 There is no need to introduce, as Tikochinsky (1988b) does, time-reversed ‘transitions’ in order to 
ensure that both endpoints refer ‘to the same time’: temporal considerations are no more required for 
working out the probability rule than they had been needed for deriving the composition rules for 
amplitudes.   
29
 Tikochinsky 1988b. 
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 As S. Saunders points out about his own derivation of the Born rule, “examination of the proof shows 
that the dependence of probabilities on the modulus square of the expansion coefficients of the state 
ultimately derives from the fact that we are concerned with unitary evolutions on Hilbert space, 
specifically an inner-product space, and not some general normed linear topological space.” (Saunders 
2002) 
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fair) coins in order to evaluate the ‘statistical distance’ between them. Given preparation 
    , the probability of the result ak associated with eigenvector       of A is    
                
     
 
. In the context that is associated with choosing A, the 
expression of the statistical distance between the two preparations is then
31
  
                                  
                        
            
          
Two preparations that correspond to the same eigenket of A are thus trivially 
indistinguishable, whereas they are statistically as far apart as two preparations can be  
if the corresponding predictors are two distinct eigenvectors of A. The sum reduces      
to a single term if one of the preparations corresponds to an A eigenket assignment.        
The statistical distance is then identical with the Hilbert space angle between the rays 
associated with those preparations. This requires a suitable reference observable to be 
chosen, relative to which a given preparation is statistically gauged. Insofar as it 
requires choosing a reference set of mutually compatible observables (e.g. all of those 
that commute with A), this connection between statistical and angular distance can be 
regarded as an expression of context-dependence. As for the relative phases of 
amplitudes, their justification must be looked for in transformational, group-
theoretically regulated properties that determine the form of the operator representatives 
of relevant, e.g. spin observables and their mutual relationships
32
. 
The ‘statistical algorithm of quantum theory33’ (SAQM) can also be formulated without 
any mention of amplitudes, e.g. in terms of probability tables
34
 and rules for extracting 
from any such table the probability of a given outcome. This requires choosing a set    
of reference measurements in terms of which the probability tables can be set up.     
Such measurements are ‘mutually unbiased’ just in case, if experimental conditions are 
such that measuring one observable in the set is certain to yield a given outcome, then 
all the possible outcomes of measuring any other observable in that set are equally 
likely. An example of such a set is given by the spin-½ observables x, y and z that 
correspond to mutually orthogonal directions x, y and z. Observables in such a set are   
as statistically distant as comparable types of measurement can be, so that redundancy 
in the information supplied by measuring any two such observables is minimal.         
The observables in question can then be regarded as providing an optimal reference for 
setting up a probability table and deriving from it a density matrix. If N+1 mutually 
unbiased basis sets are available, a NN density matrix can be constructed from the 
probability table and, conversely, the probability table is uniquely derived from the 
density matrix. The table is only constrained by the requirement that the probabilities of 
the outcomes of measuring any given reference observable add up to 1, and that the 
density matrix derived from that table admit no negative eigenvalue. The same 
conditions have to be satisfied in the composite case. If it is additionally required that 
the probabilities of the outcomes of reference measurements performed on subsystems 
should not depend on measurements one may (choose to) perform on the other 
‘complementary’ subsystems within the composite, then it follows that N2 – 1 real 
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 Wootters 1981. 
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 See Lévy-Leblond 1974 for an enlightening discussion. 
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 Redhead 1987, p.5.  
34
 Wootters 1986. 
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numbers are needed for setting up a complete probability table, and this number is just 
the same as that needed to specify a density matrix in the ‘full’ tensor product space. 
The physical (ontological) neutrality of the basic requirements is clear enough, as is the 
fact that, claims of nonlocality notwithstanding, all of the predictions of quantum theory 
in the composite case can be derived from such tables.  
An important aspect of the above derivations of both the rules for amplitudes and      
that for probability is that they are essentially independent of assumptions regarding   
the nature – ‘quantal’ or whatever – of the systems to which the predictions apply.   
That much is also true of Lucien Hardy’s tightly worked out derivation35 of the 
mathematical backbone of quantum mechanics from four or five basic axioms. Hardy’s 
ab initio reconstruction leads him to conclude that “quantum theory, when stripped of 
all its incidental structure, is simply a new type of probability theory
36.” In fact, 
switching from the SAQM to a vector space realization of classical probability theory 
comes down to accepting or rejecting a mere continuity requirement.  
Four only of Hardy’s axioms actually contribute to the derivation. The remaining one 
(HA0) serves only the purpose of specifying how computed probabilities relate to                  
the collection of relevant data: this is achieved, in practice, through the identification of 
the probabilities of measurement results with limiting relative frequencies. Nothing, 
however, in Hardy’s subsequent derivation of the SAQM depends on his preference for 
a frequency-based understanding of probability
37. Hardy’s approach builds upon the 
idea that a given setting of an appropriate preparation device fully determines the 
probabilities of all ‘non-null’ outcomes of measurements one may perform on its output. 
It is reasonable to assume that there exists a minimum number
38
 K of probabilities, 
knowledge of which suffices to characterize the predictive yield or ‘potential’ of a given 
preparation. This yield is encapsulated in what Hardy chooses to call a state, 
presumably to make the connection to quantum theory as explicit as possible from the 
outset. This choice of terminology is misleading, however, for it will soon clearly 
appear that the framework Hardy works out is primarily aimed at yielding probabilistic 
predictions, whatever the subject matter. This should be borne in mind, given Hardy’s 
common reference to “systems in some state39” or his speaking of “ascrib[ing] a state to 
a preparation
40”. 
A ‘Hardy state’ is entirely specified through the listing of K outcome probabilities, 
subject to completeness and closure conditions. Hardy now takes the crucial step of 
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 Hardy 2001a,b.  
36
 Hardy 2001b, p.1.  
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 Hardy’s introduction of ‘mixed states’ as linear combinations, with suitable probabilistic ‘weights’, of 
what he calls pure states (see text below), suggests that the primary view of probability that (HA0) 
expresses is overlaid with ‘subjective’ aspects. However, a Bayesian alternative to (HA0) (see Schack 
2002) is unlikely to satisfy many physicists, reluctant as they are to accept in their field an epistemic 
conception of probability (i.e. of probability as ‘degree of belief’); either because they feel it is simply 
inadequate in the context of handling empirical data, or for fear that their ideal of objectivity might be 
threatened. 
38
 Hardy’s reference to K as a “number of degrees of freedom” suggests a parallel with classical 
mechanics that is unwarranted – indeed almost incongruous – in this context, and is therefore best 
avoided.  
39
 Hardy 2001b, p.2. 
40
 Ibid. 
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writing those probabilities as components of a K-dimensional vector p. ‘Pure states41’ 
are by definition those primary vectors that cannot be written as convex sums of other 
vectors in the relevant set. Hardy regards it as a “driving intuition” that such “pure states 
represent definite (non-probabilistic) states of the system
42”. However, such an 
ontological construal of ‘states’ detracts from the operational foundation of the 
formalism, where the whole point of introducing them is to provide a convenient linear 
representation of probability distributions for measurement outcomes (there is no 
question here of hazily conceived propensities of physical or other kinds of systems).   
In effect, what those ‘pure states’ provide are reference sets in the following sense:       
to any such pure state, there corresponds a vector pj, the j
th
 component of which is set 
equal to 1 whilst all others are 0. This is associated with a setting of the preparation 
device for which the j
th
 outcome is certain to obtain if the relevant test is actually 
performed. Alternatively a vector rj, such that rj.pk=jk, can also be assigned to the 
corresponding ‘yes-no measurement’. Generalizing to an arbitrary preparation and any 
choice of measurement, the outcome probability is given by the scalar product r.p of 
suitably chosen r and p vectors. That Hardy’s states can be indifferently
43
 represented as 
p or r vectors bears further witness to their being close relatives to Destouches’s 
predictors and correspondingly devoid of ontological significance.  
Assuming that there is a set of ‘states’ whose members can be distinguished from each 
other by a ‘single shot’ measurement, there is no reason a priori for expecting             
their minimum number N to be equal to K. Nonetheless, a structural relation presumably 
exists between those two numbers; a relation Hardy ascribes to “a certain constancy in 
nature
44”. Regardless of whether nature has any relevance to the matter, it is a sensible 
prerequisite for setting up an optimal framework for prediction that the predictive yield 
of a preparation, as encapsulated in a ‘predictive vector’, should properly (functionally) 
connect to distinguishability within an outcome set. The (HA1) axiom asserts this 
connection, with the additional (‘simplicity’) requirement that K, as a function of N, 
take the smallest value that is consistent with the full axiom set.  
If the mode of preparation, or any conditions that prompt the assignment of a given 
predictor, imply that certain measurement outcomes are precluded, the maximum 
number of distinguishable states, hence the dimension of the predictor space, can be 
reduced accordingly. This axiom (HA2) conforms to the expectation that the probability 
of occurrence of an outcome should not depend on whether the set it belongs to             
is embedded in some larger set. Axiom (HA3) then addresses those cases where           
“a preparation device ejects its system in such a way that it [the system] can be regarded 
as made up of two subsystems
45” (1) and (2). If N1 and N2 are the numbers of 
distinguishable Hardy ‘states’ that relate to the performance of measurements on (1)  
and (2) respectively, then the number of distinguishable ‘states’ associated with joint 
(1)-(2) preparations cannot be less than N1N2. (HA3) requires N to be, in all 
circumstances, equal to N1N2. The Ki = K(Ni) components of a vector p
(i)
 are 
                                                 
41
 The null state is excluded from the set of pure states. 
42
 Ibid. (italics added). 
43
 Ibid., 2. 
44
 Hardy 2001a, 6.14. 
45
 Ibid. 6.16. 
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measurement probabilities relative to the (i)-member (i = 1 or 2) of any (1)-(2) pair.  
The construction of a ‘joint’ probability matrix in which the outcome probabilities for 
measurements performed on (1) and (2) separately are compounded suggests that       
the number K of real parameters that are necessary and sufficient for defining a (1)-(2) 
‘state’ is also just equal to the product K1K2 (this suggestion is also part of (HA3)):   
“there should not be more entanglement than necessary46” for prediction to be 
successfully (optimally) achieved.  
(HA2) and (HA3) entail that K(N+1) > K(N) and K(N
2
) = K
2
(N), and the only 
polynomial in N that satisfies those conditions is K(N) = N
r
. Now, in quantum theory,   
if the relevant Hilbert space is of dimension N, then N
2
 – 1 independent real numbers 
are required to specify a density matrix (or, in usual parlance, to fully determine            
a ‘state’). This is also the number of independent entries in Wootters’s probability table, 
which was seen to follow from requiring, besides the normalization of probability, that  
the probabilities of the results of measurements performed on any subsystem should not 
depend on which measurement is actually (or intended to be) performed on the 
complementary subsystem(s).  
Insofar as it does comply with Wootters’s ‘local accessibility’ thesis (“any set              
of measurements which are just sufficient for determining the states of the subsystems 
are, when performed jointly, also just sufficient for determining the state of                 
the combined system
47”) quantum theory qua predictive framework optimally uses 
information supplied by measurements performed separately on subsystems. It is 
satisfying that Wootters’s conjecture: that any theory which satisfies local accessibility 
through the optimality condition
48
 g(N1N2) =  g(N1) + g(N2) + g(N1)g(N2) would be 
such that g(N) = N
r
 – 1, with r a positive integer, happens to be vindicated by Hardy’s 
(HA1-2-3) axioms, since those imply that K(N) = g(N) + 1 = N
r
. Given the simplicity 
requirement that (HA1) includes, we are left with only two kinds of scheme, depending 
on whether r equals 1 or 2. The first one (K = N, r = 1) corresponds to a vector space 
realization of the classical probability calculus, in which the number of parameters 
needed to probabilistically characterize a preparation is equal to the maximum number 
of distinguishable ‘states’. Suppose, for example, that the set-up includes an apparatus 
that releases either red or green balls. The K = 2 probabilities of finding a ball to be red 
or to be green exhaust the specification of the ‘state’, whilst the maximum number of 
distinguishable ‘pure states’ is obviously N = 2: a single red/green measurement will at 
most distinguish between those two colors. It is, however, conceivable that the equality 
of K and N might not always be satisfied, and the SAQM, for which K = N
2  
, appears to 
be a case in point. Real Hilbert spaces are actually ruled out
49
 by (HA3) : for those 
spaces   
      
 
 and specifying ‘states’ in the bipartite case would then require more 
(K > K1K2) than can provide data gathered separately on the two subsystems
50
, thereby 
violating local accessibility. Complex numbers, therefore, appear to be a necessary 
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48
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 For a counterexample, see Wootters 1990, p.44. 
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 Hilbert spaces over the quaternions – if one should ever care to consider such possibilities – would 
require strictly less (K < K1K2).   
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ingredient in the kind of linear predictive scheme Destouches tentatively initiated, of 
which Wootters hypothesized some essential features and which Hardy successfully 
derives from his simple set of axioms. 
More light has recently been shed on the relationship between complex numbers         
and -composition. A linear operator  has been shown51 to exist, such that the joint 
probability for any ordered pair (E,F) of locally ‘observable’ positive operator-valued 
measures takes the trace form tr((EF)).  turns out to be unique in the case             
of complex Hilbert spaces (the proof falls short of establishing that   is, or has to be,     
a density – statistical – operator). Uniqueness follows because the set {EF} forms   
a complete basis for Hermitian operators. It is as yet unknown whether this only holds 
in the complex case, although it is highly likely: when the field is complex, the operator 
space of the tensor product is known to be isomorphic to the tensor product of             
the original operator spaces. By contrast, the dimensionality of the space of symmetric 
operators on a real Hilbert space is strictly less than that of the (complex) vector space 
of Hermitian operators over the base space, thus preventing   to be uniquely specified. 
If normalization is not assumed, all of the predictively useful information a                  
N-dimensional density matrix  encapsulates amounts to that which is supplied by         
a Hardy vector whose components are K = N
2
 probabilities. The equivalence holds 
because any Hermitian operator which admits a NN matrix representative can also     
be written as a linear combination, with real coefficients, of K = N
2
 projection 
operators. Writing those K operators as the components of a vector E, then p = tr(E). 
The most general expression of probability is tr(A), where A is a positive operator 
such that
52
  A = r.E.  
Whatever essential difference there is between ‘quantal’ and ‘classical’ frameworks 
boils down to the composition of the sets of allowed p and r vectors. The split occurs 
with axiom (HA4), which asserts the existence of a continuous reversible transformation 
along a path connecting two arbitrary ‘pure states’. This is directly linked to 
‘superpositions’ of states being allowed in the r = 2 case: a Hardy state can then be 
gradually (continuously, reversibly) transformed into another, and the ‘in-between’ 
states are linear combinations of those two states (the continuous distribution of points    
on the surface of the Bloch sphere illustrates that property of quantum-theoretic ‘states’ 
in the two-level case). In contrast, ‘classical’ (K = N) pure Hardy states form a discrete 
set (compare the red and green ball example). It is somewhat ironical that classical 
probability theory should be characterized by a necessity to ‘jump’ between ‘pure 
states’, whereas the trait that singles out quantum theory among the schemes that satisfy 
Hardy’s other axioms would be the existence of continuous transformations between its 
‘states’. Hardy suggests that the necessity to ‘jump’ from a ‘classical state’ 
corresponding to, say, a ball being in one box to that corresponding to its being in 
another merely reflects our crude partitioning of possibilities into what just appears to 
us to be clear-cut alternatives. It is quite hard, to say the least, to figure out how certain 
human (perceptual?) limitations could determine the type of Hardy scheme that should 
be selected as adequate. Why should a K = N
2
 framework replace its ‘classical’ K = N 
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counterpart as our means of investigation ‘reach out’ to a (sub)atomic realm ‘where’ our 
perception cannot guide us and our rational expectations are thus likely to be 
challenged? This is, at any rate, idle speculation: nothing in the content of Hardy’s 
axioms warrants ontological preconceptions about systems and their ‘modes of being’, 
let alone invocations of ‘natural’ limits to our cognitive or perceptual capacities.   
The most general kind of time evolution that is consistent with all the axioms is a linear 
and completely positive map on the space of operators on Hilbert space, such             
that the trace (or normalization coefficient in the pure case) does not increase.      
Unitary evolution obtains if it is required that the corresponding transformation should 
also be invertible and that it should preserve the trace, whereas ‘reduction’ means net 
trace decrease, which is accompanied by the increase of the von Neumann entropy. 
Updating the representation upon acquisition of new information is subject to the same 
basic constraints in classical (probability) and quantum theory. However, the updating 
rules reflect the structural features of each particular framework
53
. Hardy’s axioms – 
invocation of ‘states’ notwithstanding – provide no grounds for believing that any kind 
of physical ‘collapse’ accompanies the updating process. 
 
 
3. Prediction and beyond 
“…I can safely say that nobody  
understands quantum mechanics…  
Nobody knows how it can be like that.”   
–  R.P. Feynman   
                              
            Prédire n’est pas expliquer. 
           – R. Thom 
                                                                                                       
None of the derivations of the SAQM we have reviewed hinges on any assumption 
regarding the nature, ‘quantal’ or ‘classical’, of physical systems. A probabilistic 
formalism of the same kind might well turn out to be applicable, with benefit,               
to disciplines that have little, if anything, to do with the concerns of physicists
54
.       
One might also maintain that operational effectiveness in anticipating results of 
measurements is all that one should ask of a physical theory, and therefore all that 
quantum mechanics can realistically provide. Asking for ‘more’ would not be sensible, 
confusing as it does the anticipative and predictive aims of science with ‘metaphysical’ 
yearnings that cannot be substantiated. Many, however, will certainly side with 
Einstein, who once expressed his opinion on the matter in a pretty harsh way: “If that 
were so then physics could only claim the interest of shopkeepers and engineers; the 
whole thing would be a wretched bungle
55.” Physics, indeed, would not be half as 
                                                 
53
 Despite appearances, ‘state vector collapse’ may not radically differ from the ordinary Bayesian update 
of ‘classical’ probabilities; see Fuchs 2002.  
54
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55
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exciting if all it could offer were a laundry list of ‘results’ and a compendium of useful 
recipes. But however strongly one may concur, this is hardly an argument; merely the 
negative of a widespread aspiration: that of gaining an ever more faithful and accurate 
understanding of ‘what there is’.  
Let’s try to overcome our reluctance to surrender those uplifting, if unrealistic prospects 
and cautiously assume that a physical theory cannot simply (we do not say ‘simply 
cannot’) provide a description, be it approximate and forever amendable, of ‘things as 
they are’ or of ‘the world as it is’– no more, indeed, than our brains provide any direct 
access to a reality out there. One might argue that such a theory may nonetheless 
adequately reflect fundamental aspects of our experience, bearing in mind that the latter 
is never ‘raw’ but constantly and necessarily ‘informed’ through those feed-backs of our 
mental make-up that are necessary for converting ‘unformatted’ sensory inputs into 
reliable and shareable expressions of our thought. According to M. Bitbol
56
, “the basic 
formalism of quantum mechanics can effortlessly be construed as a structural 
presupposition of any activity of production and unified anticipation of mutually 
incompatible contextual phenomena
57.” A correct ‘philosophical’ evaluation of quantum 
mechanics, Bitbol contends, should have the quasi-therapeutic effect of dispelling a 
major illusion: that a phenomenon can always be in principle detached from the very 
conditions that make its occurrence possible. What Bohr strove to express in his later 
writings
58
 is that phenomena like those one encounters in atomic physics are necessarily 
and indissolubly co-determined by the experimental conditions of their manifestation 
(‘context-dependence’). This belated recognition of the aim and structure of quantum 
theory would 
“undermine the pictures so cherished by supporters of the ontological (disengaged) 
outlook…by showing that the predictive success of some of our most general 
scientific theories can be ascribed, to a large extent, to the circumstance that they 
formalize the minimal requirements of any prediction of the outcomes of our 
activity, be it gestural or experimental. The very structure of these theories is seen 
to embody the performative structure of the experimental undertaking
59.”  
Once this is realized, there will “no [longer be any] need to further explain” the 
adequacy of the quantum rules “by their ability to reflect in their structure the backbone 
of nature
60”. The position Bitbol defends is a contemporary offshoot of a distinguished 
‘critical’ tradition61, the advocates of which have striven to provide a middle way 
between the unreasonable expectations of unrestrained realism on the one hand, and the 
more unpalatable aspects of instrumentalism on the other. 
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Bitbol bases his pronouncements almost entirely upon (i) Destouches’s derivation of the 
Born rule (see Section 2) and (ii) Heelan’s unconventional take on so-called quantum 
logic
62
. The sole purpose of   functions, kets and so forth would be to provide sets of 
abstract predictors, whose mathematical properties would basically reflect their 
invariance under changes of ‘experimental contexts’. If the mutual ‘compatibility’ of 
experimentally ascertainable quantities is restricted to non-equivalent classes, 
propositions that can be asserted about values of the quantities in question cannot be  
co-ordinated in a unified way within a Boolean framework, isomorphic to the algebra  
of set-theoretical operations. Instead, the validity of Boolean logic can be maintained 
only within strictly delimited contexts. Predictive consistency across such non-
equivalent contexts will then call for a suitable ‘metacontext’ logic. Heelan63 tentatively 
argues that  
“the locus of nonclassical logic in quantum mechanics is in the plane in which 
physical contexts are related to one another, and not, as all writers have hitherto 
held, in the plane of single quantum-mechanical events…the proper subject matter 
of so-called quantum logic would be the manifold of experimental contexts in 
which it is relevant to use one linguistic or conceptual framework rather than 
another
64”.  
The characteristic orthocomplemented and non-distributive lattice structure of quantum 
logic would consist in a partial ordering of a set of experimental languages that are 
pairwise incompatible. Each language would correspond to the selection of a definite 
context i.e. of a class of experimental propositions whose conjunction is operationally 
meaningful. A metacontext language would then be required in order to co-ordinate 
propositions of languages that are tied to distinct contexts, and the corresponding lattice 
structure would be that of quantum logic. 
Ab initio derivations of the SAQM (cf. Section 2) suggest that quantum theory owes    
its structure, and in particular the form of its most basic rules, to its capacity to operate, 
as a predictive scheme, both within and across such non-equivalent, ‘incompatible’ 
contexts. Acknowledging this connection between the role of the SAQM and its 
structure would “automatically defuse[s] major paradoxes65.”  
Is this all that one should expect from a fundamental physical theory? Bitbol’s answer is 
unambiguous: “the only thing a physical theory does, and the only thing it has to do, is 
to embed documented actualities in a (deterministic or statistical) framework, and to use 
this framework to anticipate, to a certain extent, what will occur under well-defined 
experimental circumstances
66.” Our most successful theoretical frameworks would be 
(nothing but) “embodiments of the necessary pre-conditions of a wide class of activities 
of seeking and predicting
67.” Nevertheless, rather than seize an opportunity to reassess 
pre-conditions of our activities within a world-as-experience(d), many are expected to 
remain stuck with their classical, ‘pre-critical’ illusions and “systematically favor a 
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disengaged outlook, even though their very undertaking is grounded on the 
presuppositions of an engaged activity
68
.”  
But the question remains of why it should have taken confrontation with the puzzles of 
atomic physics for physicists to realize – to the extent they did – that means and 
procedures of investigation cannot be ‘neutralized’ in all circumstances. It is rather hard 
to believe that the pioneers of quantum physics did, through the finiteness of Planck’s 
constant and subsequent developments, unwittingly stumble upon (nothing but) the 
empirical trace (?) of – to put it in Bitbol’s philosophese – pre-conditions to the co-
ordination and anticipatory effectiveness of experimental activity, ending up with a 
‘mechanics’ that embodies in its structure a major philosophical lesson. Besides, how 
terms get reinforced or cancel out in the process of computing probabilities with the 
SAQM is certainly ‘wavelike’ in a rather metaphorical sense: this is paper interference, 
part and parcel of the operation of a particular type of formalism that allows one to 
predict the measured values of measurement outcomes, cross-sections and so on. It is 
quite another matter, however, to claim that a basic mathematical trait associated with 
consistent operation of a predictive scheme ‘across’ different contexts should be 
underwritten by specific interference patterns exhibited e.g. on photographic plates.  
It might well be that the SAQM is all we can afford, whether in principle or ‘only’ in 
practice, as a framework in which our – necessarily mediated – approaches to the 
microworld can find a consistent and effective mathematical expression. This should 
not prevent us, however, from attempting to trace the quantum back to sound and 
compelling physical principles. Granting that the predictive rules of quantum theory 
can, as we saw, be justified without making any ‘ontic’ reference to physical systems,    
I shall put forth the following suggestion: far from falling from the sky, the SAQM 
actually arises as a result of selecting a certain type of mathematical structure. 
Historically, this ‘selection’ unwittingly occurred in the process of elaborating a 
theoretical framework for atomic physics. More precisely, quantum theory will, in the 
next section, be seen to emerge as a by-product of setting up a consistent ‘protoquantal’ 
dynamical framework, based on the acceptance of a definitely ‘non-classical’ but well-
motivated (and by no means preposterous) postulate. Given the assumption that 
quantum mechanics, in its currently accepted form, turns out to be just such a by-
product, reasons will be adduced for resorting to the SAQM, beyond the historical fact 
that the protoquantal framework in question was never suspected by the great pioneers 
of quantum physics. 
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4. From the Quantum to the SAQM 
         
In the early days of quantum physics (mid-1910s), some parallels were pointed out 
between the integral formulation of the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantization condition and 
the action-angle methods that had been introduced half a century before to help tackle 
problems in celestial mechanics
69
. Such similarities, just as the dimensions and apparent 
ubiquity of Planck’s constant itself, suggested focusing upon action as the key quantity 
for unlocking the mystery of the quantum and working out a compelling alternative to 
classical mechanics. Such hints were all but forgotten, however, once Heisenberg, Born 
and Jordan had come up with an effective ‘matrix’ framework that seemed to owe 
nothing, except for some dubious analogies, to any classical predecessor. Action and 
related issues had briefly come back to the fore with the contributions of Louis de 
Broglie and Schrödinger. Nevertheless, the view eventually prevailed that no amount of 
reflection on the basic concepts and assumptions of classical mechanics could possibly 
help understand how and why quantum physics is so ‘special’ in the ways it departs 
from ‘classicality’. 
It is well known that, if one substitutes into Schrödinger’s time-dependent equation       
a polar form of its solution , one of the resulting two equations turns out to be identical 
with the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation, except for the presence of an ‘extra’ 
contribution. The de Broglie-Bohm ‘pilot-wave’ approach70 focuses on that             
‘non-classical’ term, interpreted as a new kind of potential, which is regarded as the 
source of all ‘quantum effects’. However, it is a major drawback of that approach that it 
relies on the prior availability of the Schrödinger equation. Besides, although Bohm’s 
guidance condition suggests a trivializing map whereby phase space coordinates 
transform into a set that is constant in time, the dual of that transformation appears       
to be left out without reason
71
. It is as if the initial substitution pointed toward some 
possible alternative to Hamilton-Jacobi theory, but without giving more, as it were,  
than half a hint. The dependence of Bohm’s quantum potential on Hamilton’s principal 
function also implies higher derivatives of that function. What is the structural role    
and conceptual significance of such higher derivatives? 
In the first part of his ‘wave mechanics’ paper72, it is with the purpose of addressing 
quantization as an eigenvalue problem that Schrödinger expressed the ‘characteristic 
function’ as the logarithm of a new function . Conversely, writing the  function, 
solution to the (one-dimensional) stationary Schrödinger equation, in polar form leads 
to a third-order non-linear differential equation that must be satisfied by the quantum-
mechanical version of the characteristic function  : 
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(   
  
  
  etc.). This equation differs from the stationary Hamilton-Jacobi equation by  
its non-vanishing right-hand side. The function   can be interpreted as the generator     
of the motion for a single trajectory (   then corresponds to the conjugate momentum). 
Knowing the trajectory then suffices to specify the  function – there is no need         
for an ensemble of such trajectories to be considered. The  function, however, does not 
always afford resolution into single trajectories. Most significantly – this can hardly    
be regarded as a ‘coincidence’ – the ‘extra’ term turns out to be proportional to the     
so-called Schwarzian derivative  
    
  
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
of  .  
The above equation will, from now on, be referred to as the quantum stationary 
Hamilton-Jacobi equation (QSHJE). The QSHJE has never been fashionable as a 
conceptual lead to the resolution of quantum mysteries. Worth mentioning, however, is 
Floyd’s ‘trajectory representation of quantum mechanics73’, which proceeds directly 
from the QSHJE, bypassing the Schrödinger equation. Floyd’s approach differs from 
Bohm’s in some fundamental respects, not least in the nature of the trajectories. 
Conjugate momentum is not identified with mechanical momentum and, since the 
QSHJE itself completely determines the motion, there is no need for any guiding field. 
Floydian trajectories, though consistent with the requirement that probability should be 
conserved, are not distributed in accordance with the  function density. They are also 
distinct from Feynman paths: in Floyd’s account, the generator of the motion ought to 
be regarded as an alternative to Hamilton’s characteristic function, whereas Feynman’s 
propagator is classical. Nowhere is any randomness involved, but our general inability 
to resolve a -based account into distinct trajectories happens (more about that later)   
to be ‘fortunately’ compensated by the use of the probabilistic methods of standard 
quantum theory.  
Being able to derive the QSHJE from the Schrödinger equation is by itself of little help 
to figure out what set of theoretical requirements could give rise to that equation 
(QSHJE) in the first place, or to decide whether its solutions are more physically 
significant than ‘wave functions’. Some invaluable light, however, has recently been 
shed on the matter by A. Faraggi and M. Matone
74
, who succeeded in deriving the 
QSHJE on the basis of a single, theoretically well-motivated ‘equivalence’ postulate75. 
In a mechanical framework where the functional dependence of the characteristic 
function or ‘reduced action’    on a set of generalized coordinates   determines                
the dynamics, does some coordinate transformation      generally exist, such that    
the resulting reduced action     has the same dependence on   as S0 has on   ? If both    
and     are non-constant, such a coordinate transformation makes sense from the point of 
view of an observer in motion relative to both systems. However, no coordinate 
transformation can map a non-constant    into the constant reduced action that 
characterizes, in classical mechanics, a free point mass with zero energy. Setting up an 
alternative (‘non-classical’) dynamical framework in which the existence of locally 
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invertible coordinate transformations is not subject to any such limitation is precisely 
the aim of Faraggi and Matone. The programme is reminiscent of Hamilton-Jacobi 
theory, although coordinate transformations only are considered, the transformation     
of   being induced by that of    through       .  
Classical mechanics never treats canonical variables on a truly equal footing. However, 
the involutive nature of the Legendre transformation, which is implied by the definition 
of the generating function, gives rise to explicit     duality (Hamilton’s equations        
of motion are, up to sign,     symmetrical). This duality can be made manifest            
by introducing a generating function   , which stands in the same relation to   as    
does to  , i.e.        . As a result, the description of a system can be indifferently 
achieved in either of the    or    pictures. Requiring both stability under evolution       
in time of the S-T relationship, and that symmetry be the highest amongst all possible 
interchanges of the two pictures leads to the ‘natural’ introduction of imaginary 
numbers (this is as far as the occurrence of complex numbers in quantum mechanics,   
at the dynamical level, can be traced back). Moreover,    and    are related through       
a so-called Möbius transformation (generators of the Möbius group are translations, 
dilations and inversions).  
According to the Equivalence Postulate (EP), for any pair of dynamical systems A and 
B there exists a coordinate transformation  A  B such that   ( A) transforms into 
  ( B), where W = V( ) – E  (V and E are the potential and the total energy terms).   
The postulate implies the existence of a coordinate mapping between any system and 
that corresponding to    0. If    satisfies the classical stationary Hamilton-Jacobi 
equation (CSHJE), then the W( )’s transform as quadratic differentials:  
             
 
    . 
Since    can then only transform into itself, the W of an arbitrary system cannot          
be connected to  
 
by an invertible coordinate transformation.Therefore, implementing 
the Equivalence Postulate calls for a radical departure from classicality.  
Mapping   into some W0 requires W  to transform non-quadratically: 
             
 
           , where the inhomogeneous term        accounts for     
the abovementioned departure. Besides, one should reasonably expect the succession   
of two transformations, one from    into    and another from    into   , to be 
equivalent to a single coordinate transformation from  
 
into  . This ‘pseudogroup’ 
requirement amounts to the satisfaction of the cocycle condition 
              
  
 
                  , 
which condition implies the invariance of         under a Möbius coordinate 
transformation       
    
    
’. The         term is then proportional to                    
the Schwarzian derivative        , which is indicative of Möbius symmetry              
(the Schwarzian derivative         
    
  
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
is such that  
    
    
          ). 
The cocycle condition uniquely determines the Schwarzian derivative, up to a global 
constant and a coboundary term, and           
  
  
        .  
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The EP-based alternative to the CSHJE can, with no loss of generality, be written   
 
  
 
   
  
 
 
             
where    
  
  
       . The inhomogeneous term is in practice negligible for very 
small values of  , and the CSHJE is recovered as    0 with    the classical reduced 
action. Just as in classical mechanics, the dynamics is encoded in the functional 
dependence of    on its argument (   will still be referred to as a ‘reduced action’, 
bearing in mind that it is not identical with its classical namesake).  
The resulting alternative to the CSHJE   
 
  
 
   
  
 
 
         
  
  
        
is just the QSHJE provided   is identified with Planck’s ‘reduced’ constant  .    
Momentum is evaluated through             , whereby a definite (Floydian) 
trajectory follows. The time-dependent Hamilton-Jacobi equation obtains upon 
substituting                 . 
   being a solution of the QSHJE is equivalent to   and   , such that  
  
 
   
  
 
 , being  
linearly independent solutions of the equation  
  
  
  
  
   
            
Identification of   with   yields Schrödinger’s stationary equation.  
The ‘quantum potential’ Q is fundamentally different from Bohm’s in that, consistently 
with the Equivalence Postulate,    is never constant. This fact is reflected in the bipolar 
form  
   
   
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
      
 
 
    
of a general solution of Schrödinger’s equation. As Einstein objected to Bohm76,        
the classical motion does not always get recovered in the (improper)    0 limit.      
The objection does not apply in the present context since the quantum reduced action 
can never be constant.  
A consistent exploitation of the Equivalence Postulate requires the coordinate 
transformations to be locally invertible. Continuity conditions for the existence of the 
Schwarzian derivative must also hold on the extended real line. Schrödinger’s 
eigenvalue problem connects to a local invertibility condition thanks to a theorem
77
  that 
makes energy quantization a manifestation of the existence of a self-homeomorphism of 
the extended real line (the existence of this self-homeomorphism is directly reflected in 
the Möbius invariance of the ratio 
  
 
 ). Thus, the EP leads to quantization as a response 
to symmetries that underlie the form of the QSHJE. Most significantly, quantization 
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does not require that all ‘physical’ solutions to the Schrödinger equation should be 
square summable, but only that such solutions exist.  
Summarizing, the QSHJE can be derived as a consequence of complying with a single 
postulate (EP): the term whereby the QSHJE differs from its classical predecessor 
originates in the postulated universal existence of a trivializing coordinate 
transformation. Schrödinger’s stationary equation follows as a result of linearizing the 
QSHJE. The existence of the trivializing coordinate transformation requires the form of 
a general solution of the Schrödinger equation to be bipolar, in accordance with Floyd’s 
approach and in disagreement with Bohm’s. An existence condition for the Schwarzian 
derivative is that the total energy E admit a value that is an eigenvalue of the 
corresponding Schrödinger equation, or equivalently that the Schrödinger equation 
admit a solution that is a       function on the real line. Quantization does not require 
that all ‘physically acceptable’   functions should be square summable. However, 
interest in solutions having that property is justified, a posteriori, insofar as their 
existence provides a structural basis for setting up the kind of effective predictive 
scheme that was discussed in Section 2. In its operation as such a scheme, quantum 
theory has amply proven to be able to make up for the potential loss of descriptive 
power implied in bypassing the Q(S)HJE and relying instead exclusively on solutions  
of the Schrödinger equation. 
Are ‘quantum’ probabilities dispensable? Implications of a theorem by M. Gromov 
provide at least a hint at an answer. The theorem itself
78
, which relates to the existence 
of a certain symplectic invariant (symplectic width), falls way beyond the scope of this 
paper. One of its consequences, however, is an intriguing classical precursor of 
Heisenberg’s ‘uncertainty principle’. Any attempt to determine empirically the phase 
space coordinates                   of a system with N degrees of freedom is, in 
practice, limited by the resolutions     and     of measurements. Letting      be the 
minimal value amongst the areas           of all the N error ‘boxes’, the theorem 
implies that determining a pair         with a given accuracy requires that some of the 
remaining degrees of freedom be known with the same or better accuracy,  but the error 
cannot be made less than     . In classical mechanics though, nothing prevents setting 
in principle       . It may be conjectured, however, that an alternative dynamical 
framework based upon the QSHJE preserves that consequence of Gromov’s theorem, 
supplementing it with a lower bound    on the permissible values of       , where   
is the empirical value of the structural constant  .  Were this highly plausible conjecture 
to be proven
79
, one might be justified in regarding the emergence of quantum theory as 
a response, however unwitting, to the impossibility of taking, even in principle, full 
advantage of a dynamical account based upon the QSHJE (an equation that is 
notoriously tricky to solve). The possibility of developing a Hardy r=2 type of 
predictive scheme (SAQM) happens to be, fortunately enough, afforded through the 
existence of a ‘special’ class of solutions to the Schrödinger equation, which existence 
would manifest itself in the quantization of energy. 
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the implications of Gromov’s theorem and supplying some references. 
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 This might connect to the result that the EP implies phase space nonlocalization, which directly reflects 
the simple fact that a point cannot be diffeomorphic to a line (Faraggi and Matone 2000). 
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If the QSHJE is regarded as the basic equation underlying all things quantum- 
mechanical, then classical dynamics can, in practice (only), be regarded as a limiting 
case of ‘quantum behavior’. But why should a theoretical framework, in which the 
appearance of an action quantum   =   and the quantization of energy can80 be 
conceived as manifestations of an ‘equivalence’ postulate, be adequate to investigating 
structures and processes on (sub)atomic scales? To the best of our current 
understanding, the most that can be said is to remark that the coincidence of   with the 
empirically given   is neither more nor less mysterious than the identification of the 
structural constant c with the empirical value of the speed of light
81
. All there is to the 
‘microscopic’ adequacy, both descriptive (QSHJE, to the extent it is practicable) and 
predictive (SAQM), of quantum mechanics – besides some essential group-theoretical 
input – might just be the smallness of Planck’s constant in conventional units that are 
tailored to human scales. 
Early breakthroughs, from the resolution of the black-body or photoelectric puzzles     
to the Bohr-Sommerfeld model of the atom, had given physicists very few hints            
at structural necessities behind the occurrence of Planck’s quantum. When a new 
scheme eventually emerged, its agreement with the empirical data appeared to be quasi-
miraculous. As we have come to realize, this was made possible because the very form 
of the Schrödinger equation (or its matrix/operator equivalents) happens to lend itself    
to setting up a consistent and adequate ‘non-classical’ framework for prediction.  
Behind the ‘miracle’, there is the fact that Hilbert space structure both (i) yields,         
through a linearization procedure, a faint echo of protoquantal dynamics as captured    
in the QSHJE, and (ii) constrains the linear representation of groups that determine
82
  
the form of quantities whose measurement are the object of prediction by means of     
the SAQM. The latter is a Hilbert space-based (Hardy r=2) scheme for the calculation 
of probabilities of measurement outcomes that hinges on the identification of a cross-
contextual mathematical entity or predictor (‘state vector’, density matrix) that 
characterizes the ‘predictive potential’ of a given preparation. To be adequate, the 
predictive algorithm must obviously preserve the compliance of probability with the 
Kolmogorov axioms within any given context i.e. with respect to any chosen set of 
mutually compatible observables. On the other hand, its basic rules will be constrained 
in accordance with an underlying metacontext lattice structure that is non-Boolean 
(Heelan’s thesis). Although neither Hardy’s axioms nor Destouches’s more rudimentary 
calcul des prévisions make explicit reference to context-dependence, it is satisfying      
to conceive of the form of the statistical algorithm of quantum theory as reflecting       
its role in co-ordinating probabilistic valuations at a metacontext level – in other words, 
to think of it as an algorithm that functions both within and across definite contexts.  
                                                 
80
 Admittedly, much remains to be clarified about the conceptual meaning and the significance of the EP. 
What matters to us here is not any particular commitment to Matone and Faraggi’s EP approach, but     
the recognition of the action-based roots of quantum mechanics and of the central role of the QSHJE      
as the physical source of the Schrödinger equation.  
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 It will never be emphasized enough that the Lorentz transformation can be (and, I strongly believe, 
should be) derived from a single postulate, without making any reference to the propagation of light    
(see e.g. Lévy-Leblond 1976). 
82
 Lévy-Leblond 1974. 
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Tensor product composition allows the predictive formalism to be applicable                
to preparations that are multipartite, i.e. such that various agents may operate separately            
on ‘parts’ of a ‘larger’ system, then work out statistics of their results, including specific 
correlations. It is legitimate to inquire about the way mutual relationships between parts 
of a composite system should be treated in a truly ‘quantum dynamical’ framework, and 
how the dynamics of the whole connects to that of the constituent parts. However, those 
are matters that will not be settled using the resources of quantum theory as we know 
and use it, if the latter essentially functions as a predictive scheme. Careful comparison 
of locally gathered data does exhibit correlations that cannot be accounted for on the 
basis of a simple-minded picture relying on common causes. Owing to the purely 
predictive scope of the SAQM, this means nothing but that some commonsense 
expectations associated with classical (typically ‘non-contextualized’) uses of the 
probability calculus need not apply to all kinds of predictive schemes. It certainly does 
not imply the existence of any sort of nonlocal influences. Manifestations of alleged 
nonlocality in the quantum-mechanical setting are all notoriously ineffective: ‘quantum’ 
correlations cannot be made use of for signalling superluminally or achieving spooky 
‘transfers’ in a controllable manner (quantum teleportation83, despite its name, is no 
exception to the rule). Although belief in nonlocality as a pervasive and radically non-
classical feature of quantum theory, or as a trait inherent in a ‘quantum world’, remains 
predominant, some of the most dedicated explorers of quantum mysteries have voiced a 
well-informed perplexity:   
“…people may have become too facile in their readiness to blame everything on (or 
credit everything to) “quantum nonlocality”. Nonlocality seems to me to offer “too 
cheap” a way out of some deep conundra [sic] (to appropriate Einstein’s remark to 
Born about Bohm’s theory). If you push hard on it you can force “nonlocality” into 
offering some explanations that strike me as just plain silly….people have been a 
little too quick in talking themselves into this widely held position
84
.”  
If the predictive rules of quantum theory can be derived without making any ‘ontic’ 
reference to physical systems, it is just as important to realize that the SAQM owes its 
structure and its actual availability to the existence of a certain class of solutions to the 
Schrödinger equation, and that this equation can itself be derived as a mere by-product 
of a principle-based dynamical framework that is regulated by the Q(S)HJE. 
Fundamental aspects of ‘quantum behavior’, illustrated e.g. by the two-slit experiment, 
will not be elucidated as long as baffling invocations of ‘self-interference’, or the use of 
half-baked notions like welcher Weg (which-way) or even more fashionable quantum 
information, take precedence over a painstaking study of dynamics at an appropriate 
protoquantal level (which does not mean Bohm’s dynamics). Only after – or if – this is 
undertaken will our understanding of the quantum measure up to our predictive abilities. 
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